PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE thru its Administrator, COL.
FELIPE B. PILAPIL, LT. COL. CRISANTO NAFARETTE, LT. COL. IGMIDIO BUENA, LT.
COL. SIBAYAN, CAPT. HENRY FERNANDEZ, FIRST LT. VICTOR CALLES, Petitioners, |
G.R. No. 161405
Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
- versus - |
|
YOLANDA ARQUERO, ANABELLE ROMARATE, BENIGNO VILLENA, WENIFREDA
DE GUZMAN and the NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP. No. 71548, which set aside the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in SCA No. 2188. The Court of Appeals also permanently enjoined petitioners from undertaking eviction and demolition operations against respondents.
The facts are as follows.
Petitioner
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) is a government agency under the
Department of National Defense. It is tasked to administer the Libingan ng mga Bayani, a parcel of land
reserved for national shrine purposes by virtue of Proclamation No. 208.[3] Petitioners Col. Felipe Pilapil,
Lt. Col. Crisanto Nafarette,
Lt. Col. Igmidio Buena, Lt. Col. Sibayan,
Capt. Henry Fernandez, and First Lt. Victor Calles
are members of the Task Force for securing the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.
Respondents Yolanda Arquero, Anabelle Romarate, Benigno Villena, Wenifreda de Guzman, and
the members of the Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, composing about 400 families are
residents of Sitio Masigasig,
a parcel of land in
Sometime in 2001, petitioners conducted demolition operations in Sitio Masigasig, prompting respondents to petition the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problem (COSLAP) to declare the disputed land as alienable and to subdivide it for disposition to its occupants in accordance with Proclamation No. 2476.[4]
Meanwhile, members of the Task Force
continued with the demolition. In a meeting with the Presidential Commission on
the Urban Poor and the PVAO, respondents were offered a temporary relocation
site in Sitio Maliwanag.
They refused the offer and instead filed with the
The RTC denied the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby resolved
that the petition for prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The RTC likewise denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner on
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals set aside the aforequoted RTC rulings and permanently enjoined petitioners from carrying out the demolition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Order dated January 31, 2002 and the Order
dated April 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 69, in Special Civil Action Case No. 2188 are hereby SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered permanently enjoining the members of the Task
Force Bantay from undertaking eviction and demolition
operations against the residents of Sitio Masigasig in violation of Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban
Development Housing Act. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ALLOWING
RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71548 SINCE A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST APPEAL.
II
JUDGE PAHIMNA DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS
HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS SINCE THEY ARE NOT PERFORMING
JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS. HENCE, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION
DOES NOT LIE AGAINST PETITIONERS.
III
ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE REMEDY OF
PROHIBITION IS AVAILABLE, JUDGE PAHIMNA DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING RESPONDENTS’
AMENDED PETITION FOR PROHIBITION SINCE RESPONDENTS’ BASIS IN FILING THE SAME, I.E.,
THEY OWN THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, IS BELIED NOT ONLY BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY HEREIN PETITIONERS, BUT ALSO, AND IRONICALLY, BY RESPONDENTS’ OWN EVIDENCE.
INDEED, THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS WITHIN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI OR THE
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING R.A.
NO. 7279 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SINCE SECTION 5 THEREOF CLEARLY EXEMPTS FROM
THE COVERAGE THEREOF A CEMETERY OR MEMORIAL PARK SUCH AS THE LNMB.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE LNMB AREA IS NOT BEING USED FOR THE PURPOSE IT WAS RESERVED.[9]
During the pendency of the instant petition, petitioner PVAO authorized the Philippine Army to use the disputed lot as relocation site for its 525th Engineer Battalion, allowing the latter to build structures thereon.[10]
Unfortunately,
on
With this turn of events, the lone issue for the resolution of this case is whether the injunctive writ still stands considering the supervening event that has thoroughly altered the nature of this controversy.
Petitioners contend that the permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was already mooted by the fire, which destroyed respondents’ houses. They argue that respondents voluntarily vacated the disputed area because of the said fire. Petitioners claim that their action cannot be considered demolition, which presupposes the existence of structures in the concerned premises. Thus, petitioners maintain, they could not have possibly violated the injunctive writ. Further, petitioners assert that the construction of barbed wires around the subject area is an act of ownership. They claim that the disputed area is covered by a title in the name of the government and is reserved by law for the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Respondents, however, counter that a writ of preliminary injunction is primarily intended to maintain the status quo existing prior to the filing of the case. Before the controversy started, respondents claim, they lived in houses conducive to dwelling, made of concrete and with proper roofing. Respondents insist that they should be allowed to restore their houses to the said condition. They posit that the fire did not destroy the effectivity of the injunctive writ and that the repair of their houses is still within the coverage of permanent injunction. Respondents assert that the barbed wires set up by the Task Force have the same effect as demolition in the sense that they are left without houses conducive to dwelling. Thus, they pray that petitioners be enjoined from interfering in the repair of their houses and be cited for indirect contempt for allegedly disobeying the permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals.
We
rule for petitioners.
As adverted to earlier, the resolution of the instant controversy has been radically simplified by the occurrence of a supervening event during the pendency of the petition.
Respondents’
homes have already been destroyed on account of the massive fire that occurred
on
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment requiring a party to refrain from particular acts.[11] Injunction is a remedy used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties. It is designed to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.[12]
Nonetheless, we are unable to sustain respondents’ argument that they should be allowed to repair their houses because the injunctive writ was intended to maintain the status quo existing prior to the filing of the case. This proposition conveniently leaves out the significant fact that the subject houses have already been destroyed; and not by the members of the Task Force, but by force majeure.
Clearly, the injunctive writ was issued for the sole and specific purpose of preventing the members of the Task Force from undertaking eviction and demolition operations against the residents of Sitio Masigasig. The writ does not authorize respondents to conduct repairs on their houses. Neither does it prohibit the members of the Task Force from installing barbed wires to secure the area. We are not prepared to read into the said writ any other meaning than its plain and obvious import. Needless to stress, the memorial park for our national heroes, the Libingan ng mga Bayani, ought no longer be subject to emotional controversy and should be respected as the fitting resting place of our fallen soldiers and martyrs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP. No. 71548, which set
aside the Orders of the
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
(On official
leave) ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 49-70. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria, and Rosmari D. Carandang concurring.
[2] Dated
[3] EXCLUDING FROM THE
OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 423, DATED
[4] EXCLUDING FROM THE
OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 423 DATED JULY 12, 1957, WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE MILITARY RESERVATION KNOWN AS FORT WILLIAM MCKINLEY (NOW FORT ANDRES
BONIFACIO, SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF PASIG-TAGUIG AND PARAÑAQUE,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY (NOW OF METROPOLITAN MANILA), A CERTAIN
PORTION OF LAND EMBRACED THEREIN KNOWN AS BARANGAYS LOWER BICUTAN, UPPER
BICUTAN AND SIGNAL VILLAGE SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METROPOLITAN
MANILA, AND DECLARING THE SAME OPEN FOR DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
ACTS NOS. 274 AND 730. Issued on
[5] Records, pp. 2-14.
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 69.
[9]
[10]
[11] Rules
of Court, Rule 58, Sec. 1.
[12] Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc., G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 236, 251.